

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 ACDE-00 /088 W

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P R 181458Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0974

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0152

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0202

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD

APRIL 14-17, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE APRIL 17 PLENARY MEETING AND
END-OF-ROUND PRESS CONFERENCES BY EAST AND WEST BROUGHT
TO A CLOSE THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH ARE DUE TO RESUME IN THE WEEK OF MAY 12. EASTERN

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REPS PROCEEDED ON TWO LEVELS THIS WEEK, RE-STATING THEIR

STANDARD POSITIONS DURING THE PLENARY AND INFORMAL MEETINGS AND AT THE EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE, BUT HINTING IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT POSSIBLE FUTURE FLEXIBILITY ON A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL ISSUES. AT ITS APRIL 16-17 MEETINGS, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED END-OF-ROUND REPORT TO NAC. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE LAST WEEK OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE EAST BROKE NO NEW GROUND IN THE INFORMAL AND PLENARY MEETINGS. IN THE APRIL 15 INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS REPEATED THEIR CLAIM THAT, DURING THE CURRENT ROUND, THE EAST HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE AND THE WEST INFLEXIBLE, AND THAT THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN POSITION WAS A DELIBERATELY ONE-SIDED ANALYSIS, BOTH OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS. WESTERN REPS SAID THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE EASTERN REFUSAL DURING THE PRESENT ROUND TO TAKE A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, BY THE FACT THAT THE EAST HAD NOT RESPONDED DURING THIS ROUND TO REPEATED WESTERN OFFERS TO DISCUSS DATA, AND THAT THE EAST THUS FAR HAD NOT ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. ALLIED REPS ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THESE TOPICS FOR ANSWER BY EAST FOLLOWING THE SPRING RECESS. EASTERN REPS CAREFULLY NOTED THEM, AND SEEMED TO GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO AVOID PESSIMISTIC FORECASTS.

3. IN THIS WEEK'S PLENARY MEETING, THE USUAL CLOSING STATEMENTS WERE PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET AND US REPS. THE US STATEMENT, CONTAINED A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OF THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS ON THAT SITUATION. IN HIS STATEMENT, US REP STRESSED THAT, IN CONSIDERING WHETHER POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS ARE ACCEPTABLE, PARTICIPANTS MUST EVALUATE WHAT THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD BE ON THEIR SECURITY. THIS REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF ENDURING LIMITATIONS WHICH AN AGREEMENT WOULD IMPOSE, AS WELL AS CALCULATION OF THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS TAKEN BY THE TWO SIDES. US REP CONCLUDED THAT ANALYSIS OF BOTH EXISTING EASTERN ADVANTAGES, AND NEW ADVANTAGES

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EAST WILL OBTAIN FROM ANY AGREEMENT, FULLY JUSTIFIED ALLIED DEMANDS FOR ASYMMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS.

4. THE SOVIET STATEMENT WAS A STANDARD ALBEIT FAIRLY STRONG PRESENTATION OF THE EASTERN POSITION. AFTER REVIEWING EASTERN PROPOSALS TO DATE, SOVIET REP CONTRASTED EASTERN FLEXIBILITY WITH THE TOTAL LACK OF WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THE CURRENT ROUND AND CHARGED THAT

THIS WESTERN LACK OF FLEXIBILITY AND UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EASTERN POSITION WAS EVIDENCE OF CURRENT ALLIED UNWILLINGNESS TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

5. KHLESTOV SAID WESTERN RIGIDITY WAS MANIFESTED MAINLY BY THE UNREADINESS OF NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO ASSUME CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS, BY WESTERN DEMANDS FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AND BY WESTERN REFUSAL TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. SOVIET REP ALSO CRITICIZED WESTERN INSISTENCE ON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND ALLEGED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING "FUNDAMENTALLY CONTRADICTS THE AGREED AIMS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS". SOVIET REP ALSO CRITICIZED ALLIED ARGUMENTATION ON DISPARITIES AND ON EASTERN GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES, SAYING THE WESTERN GEOGRAPHIC ARGUMENT DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF TRANSFERRING NATO TROOPS FROM OTHER AREA OF EUROPE TO THE CENTER OF EUROPE.

6. FOLLOWING THE APRIL 17 PLENARY MEETING END-OF-ROUND PRESS CONFERENCES WERE HELD, WITH NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS SPEAKING FOR THE WEST AND POLISH REP STRULAK AS THE EASTERN SPOKESMAN. BOTH PRESS CONFERENCES WERE ROUTINE, IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT DURING THE CURRENT ROUND. HOWEVER, THE JOURNALISTS PRESSED STRULAK RATHER HARD ON EASTERN UNWILLINGNESS, SO FAR, TO DISCUSS OR EXCHANGE DATA.

7. IN CONTRAST TO THE STANDARD EASTERN PRESENTATION AT THIS WEEK'S PLENARY AND INFORMAL MEETINGS, AND AT THE POLISH REP'S PRESS CONFERENCE, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF INTERESTING EAST-WEST BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, IN WHICH
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EASTERN DELEGATES HINTED AT POSSIBLE FUTURE FLEXIBILITY ON THE NATIONAL CEILING ISSUE, AS WELL AS ON READINESS TO DISCUSS A GROUND FORCE DEFINITION AND DATA IN THE NEXT ROUND, FOLLOWING THE SPRING RECESS. THESE BILATERAL EASTERN HINTS WERE GENERALLY CONDITIONAL ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF VARIOUS BASIC EASTERN DEMANDS, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. EASTERN MOTIVATIONS REMAIN UNCLEAR AND EASTERN REPS DOUBTLESS WERE PROBING IN THESE EXCHANGES FOR SIGNS OF FUTURE ALLIED INTENTIONS.

8. THESE END-OF-ROUND INDICATORS OF FUTURE EASTERN FLEXIBILITY SHOULD, ACCORDINGLY, BE TREATED WITH CAUTION. NONETHELESS, THEY DO INDICATE SOME DEGREE OF EASTERN INTEREST IN FINDING A BASIS FOR MOVEMENT ON MBFR

FOLLOWING NEARLY EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION IN
VIENNA. RESOR

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